The recent escalation in Omdurman with Rapid Support Forces (RSF) shelling resulting in civilian casualties emphasises this ongoing violence. The underlying causes of the conflict remain unaddressed, perpetuating a cycle of violence. Neither side, the SAF or RSF, are definitively ending.
Although the SAF’s recapture of the state television, as well as the presidential palace, represent symbolic victories, it is unlikely to advance the cause of peace significantly.
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) maintain control over substantial areas of Sudan, including parts of Khartoum and Darfur. Despite the SAF’s military gains, the RSF continue re-grouping and launching counter-offensives. The paramilitary force’s recent lightning operations, which involved drone attacks resulting in the deaths of journalists and military personnel, illustrates its ability to disrupt the already precarious efforts. The persistent instability means that Khartoum, the political and administrative centre of Sudan, remains contested battleground.
While the battle for Khartoum is a major concern, the conflict in Sudan is far more extensive. The country is effectively divided, with the SAF controlling the north and east, and the RSF dominating the south and western Darfur. The RSF’s recent seizure of towns such as Al-Kuhla and Lagawa illustrates its ability to seize and control territory, indicating that neither side will easily win this war. Particularly worrisome is the RSF’s strong presence in Darfur, a region already grappling with decades of ethnic violence, warlord-ism, and instability. The Darfurian, destabilised by the recent attack on the famine-stricken Abu Shouk refugee camp, has inflicted further suffering on vulnerable populations trapped in the conflict.
The SAF’s counter-offensive has been limited in its success. Despite prolonged efforts, it has been unable to retake El-Fasher, highlighting the RSF’s logistical strength and territorial dominance. The RSF’s access to resupply routes through Libya strengthens its ability to control large areas. This situation is reminiscent of the territorial division that occurred when South Sudan seceded in 2011, raising the alarming possibility of a permanent division of Sudan into two warring factions — a de facto partition that would have dire ramifications for all of the country.
The continuing conflict in Sudan between the SAF, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), is a symptom of a deeply ingrained regional war. The RSF is a product of the Janjaweed militias responsible for the Darfur genocide, is a product of this system, for former president Omar al-Bashir. It is not simply a factional dispute; it is the result of decades of military dominance, ethnic divisions, and a disregard for civilian governance. The collapse of the power-sharing government between military and civilians following Bashir’s removal, paved the way for this devastating war.
Furthermore, Khartoum and Sudan h...
Although the SAF’s recapture of the state television, as well as the presidential palace, represent symbolic victories, it is unlikely to advance the cause of peace significantly.
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) maintain control over substantial areas of Sudan, including parts of Khartoum and Darfur. Despite the SAF’s military gains, the RSF continue re-grouping and launching counter-offensives. The paramilitary force’s recent lightning operations, which involved drone attacks resulting in the deaths of journalists and military personnel, illustrates its ability to disrupt the already precarious efforts. The persistent instability means that Khartoum, the political and administrative centre of Sudan, remains contested battleground.
While the battle for Khartoum is a major concern, the conflict in Sudan is far more extensive. The country is effectively divided, with the SAF controlling the north and east, and the RSF dominating the south and western Darfur. The RSF’s recent seizure of towns such as Al-Kuhla and Lagawa illustrates its ability to seize and control territory, indicating that neither side will easily win this war. Particularly worrisome is the RSF’s strong presence in Darfur, a region already grappling with decades of ethnic violence, warlord-ism, and instability. The Darfurian, destabilised by the recent attack on the famine-stricken Abu Shouk refugee camp, has inflicted further suffering on vulnerable populations trapped in the conflict.
The SAF’s counter-offensive has been limited in its success. Despite prolonged efforts, it has been unable to retake El-Fasher, highlighting the RSF’s logistical strength and territorial dominance. The RSF’s access to resupply routes through Libya strengthens its ability to control large areas. This situation is reminiscent of the territorial division that occurred when South Sudan seceded in 2011, raising the alarming possibility of a permanent division of Sudan into two warring factions — a de facto partition that would have dire ramifications for all of the country.
The continuing conflict in Sudan between the SAF, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), is a symptom of a deeply ingrained regional war. The RSF is a product of the Janjaweed militias responsible for the Darfur genocide, is a product of this system, for former president Omar al-Bashir. It is not simply a factional dispute; it is the result of decades of military dominance, ethnic divisions, and a disregard for civilian governance. The collapse of the power-sharing government between military and civilians following Bashir’s removal, paved the way for this devastating war.
Furthermore, Khartoum and Sudan h...
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The Mercury (Digital) - 1 Issue, March 28, 2025